Later, as her mousetrap moves toward production, Woolworth begins to consider possible product names and asks for suggestions. An employee, inspired by the cat in Disney's "Pinocchio," suggests "Figaro." Woolworth adopts that as her trademark.
Having heard of her ancestor's experience, Woolworth pays careful attention to what consumers want. Her mousetraps sell well --so well that, as her firm begins to break even, a larger firm closely copies them, as well as their instructions and labels. With better established marketing channels and other advantages, it undersells her by 20%. Unable to lower her price and stay in business, Woolworth consults an IP attorney. First, she learns that her printed material is already protected by copyright. When challenged, the competitor easily evades copyright liability by rewriting. Second, she learns that no patent is possible if sought more than one year after a product is offered for sale.
[23] Third, she learns of the need to determine whether her mousetrap infringes another's patents. A search shows that a minor component does. A license is available but costs too much. So, she disposes of inventory and redesigns her product.
Shortly thereafter, the employee who suggested "Figaro" leaves and registers the name locally. About the same time, Woolworth receives a letter objecting to her use of "Figaro." Because it is cheaper than litigation, she must write off her goodwill. Selecting, clearing and federally registering some other mark would probably would cost considerably less than the cost of informing consumers of the new mark. [24] No entrepreneur wants to use precious startup capital for legal fees. Yet, Woolworth's failure to explore others' rights was at least as unwise as purchasing a building without a clear title.
Had her first lawyer been better informed, our hypothetical Woolworth would have been much better off. It costs little to register copyrights, [25] but this substantially alters the affordability of litigation. Also, patent costs could easily have been justified. [2] See, e.g., Thomas G. Field, Jr., Maximizing the Return from Genome Research, 5 Risk 95 (1994) (introducing a symposium on the topic); see also, papers following. The Congress shall have power... to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries. [Emphasis added.] It is interesting that "science" corresponds to authors (copyrights) and "useful arts" to inventors (patents). When the clause was written, the former obviously meant "knowledge" and the latter "technology." The patent statute foreshortens "useful arts" to "art," but the word connotes technology.
[7] See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (that a lamp base was patentable did not preclude its being copyrightable); see also, Appln. of Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389, 1393 (CCPA 1974) (an applicant could have both a design patent and copyrights on a Spiro Agnew watch).
[8] Id. See also generally, Brief Survey... Patent, Trademark, Copyright, supra note 3, at 89 (a proposal for reconciling IP options).
[9] Compare Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 489 (1974) ("In the case of trade secret law no reasonable risk of deterrence from patent application by those who can reasonably expect to be granted patents exists.").
[10] Even in The AALS Directory of Law Teachers 1993-94, the list of intellectual property professors occupied only 2 pages, and those with more than 10 years of experience, less than half of a page. The list of contracts professors, however, ran 6.5 page, and those with more than 10 years experience occupied over 2 pages.
By the time The AALS Directory of Law Teachers 2005-2006 was published, the list of IP professors had increased by 250%, whereas contracts professors had increased only 38%.
[11] Id.
[12] While less than half of FPLC's J.D. graduates took any intellectual property courses prior to 1990, enrollments have dramatically increased. About half of the first year class elects my introductory course, and very few obtain J.D.s without taking at least one IP course.
[13] See Paul Goldstein, Patent, Copyright and Related State Doctrines, preface (1973).
[14] The 1965 Agency Practice Act, codified at 5 U.S.C. § 500, provides that no other federal agency can require an attorney to do more than file a written declaration of representation. See also 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(D) and Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963) (finding that states cannot regard U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) recognized patent practitioners as engaged in the unauthorized practice of law).
[15] Several are illustrated below. See also, e.g., my online discussion, Avoiding Patent, Trademark & Copyright Problems --one in a series addressed to the needs of, e.g., artists, inventors and entrepreneurs. [21] For example, in Jan. 1994, the Federal Trade Commission published Invention Promotion Firms, a pamphlet in its "Facts for Consumers" series. It has also filed several suits.
Also, in 1999, a new section was added to the patent statute: 35 U.S.C § 297. Information is available at the PTO website.
[22] See the ways to avoid such firms, published by a non-profit assistance program in 1996. Advice provided there is still worth heeding.
[23] U.S. patents are barred for failure to apply within one year of a product's being publicly disclosed anywhere or offered for sale in the U.S.; 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Throughout most of the world, the right is forfeited immediately.
[24] Based on American Intellectual Property Law Association, Committee on Economics of Legal Practice, Report of the Economic Survey 2003, 59 . in 2002, the combined average charges for a search, application and prosecution were about $2500 --plus PTO fees).
[25] Based on the Economic Survey, supra , at 65, the median charge for copyright registration in 1997 was about $200, but the process is usually so simple that most people do it themselves.
[26] See, e.g., my discussion Seeking Cost-Effective Patents. As recounted there, inventors can control costs in several ways. For example, if a novelty search is unfavorable, most further expense can be avoided. If an invention cannot be marketed successfully, maintenance fees need not be paid (current information about those and other fees is available at the PTO website). Those who regard patents as anticompetitive should consider, e.g., that: [33] [T]he patent system encourages competitive effort... that would not otherwise take place. The television industry, for example, was for all practical purposes nonexistent a decade ago --now it dwarfs the radio industry.... Yet, the industry is characterized by huge research [costs]... --over $65 million in color television already and the return is yet to come. These expenditures have been made in anticipation of monetary return through patent license royalties. The antibiotics industry, limited to penicillin a decade ago, is now the scene of the most intense competition....
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III. Protecting Work Products
In spite of such arguments, the Supreme Court was especially hostile through the 1960's. It seemed to relish holding patents invalid. Once, Justice Jackson critically observed that the only valid patent was one that had not come before the Court. [34] In 1952, at the urging of the bar, Congress revised and codified the law. The situation was still regarded as unsatisfactory, [35] Earlier, two federal courts of appeal had shared jurisdiction to review PTO decisions, [41] and all circuits had jurisdiction over patent litigation. [42] This arrangement, coupled with infrequent Supreme Court review, facilitated the application of different validity standards in obtaining and enforcing patents, as well as the development of diverse infringement standards. [43] Now, judges who review PTO decisions also consider patents in the context of infringement litigation. This makes it more likely that only valid patents will be granted.
[44] Some may be surprised, but corporate patent attorneys in particular would not want it otherwise. While a firm's patents keep competitors at bay, its competitors' patents likewise keep it at bay! Moreover, CAFC decisions have led to a perception that valid patents will be enforced.
[45] Thus, that Court may encourage settlement by eliminating wasteful forum shopping and reducing uncertainty.
Kinds of patent
Three distinct kinds of patents are available in the U.S. --utility, design and plant, in descending order of grants. Utility patents are uniformly meant when "patent" is used alone. That convention is followed here. Their subject matter includes machines, commercial processes, compositions of matter and articles of manufacture.
[46] These categories are not important, but subject matter has been the subject of considerable litigation.
[47] Design patents protect ornamental features, [48] rather than the function, of articles such as containers [49] or light fixtures.
[50] In contrast with plant and utility patents, design patents last fourteen years from the date of grant instead of twenty years from first filing. [51] Plant patents reward discovery of previously uncultivated plants or the breeding of novel plants. However, asexual propagation is needed.
[52] Because naturally occurring plants may be protected, the subject matter of plant patents need not be objectively novel.
[53] This is a major distinguishing feature of plant patents; another is that infringement should occur only if protected plants are reproduced by grafting from patented stock. In both regards, plant patents seem to resemble "copyright" more than they do "patent" protection. [54] 
Acquiring patents
All patents require PTO approval of an application;[55] i.e., a patent must issue before any rights are conferred.
[56] The procedure for all three is similar, but the remaining discussion contemplates only utility patents.
Before an application is filed, [57] the subject matter should be considered. Although some aspects of an invention may encompass debatable subject matter,[58] a specialist may be able to obtain adequate coverage. For example, while one cannot obtain a utility patent on a naturally occurring substance, [59] a claim drawn on an essentially pure form of that substance (or a method of obtaining it) may be patentable if it satisfies other requirements.
Also, before filing, a prior art search should be made. [61] An invention could be fully disclosed in a patent or elsewhere; if so, it is not novel and is unpatentable. [62] Alternatively, one or more elements of the invention may lack novelty; in that case, one must convince an examiner that the invention would have been "unobvious" to those skilled in the art at the time it was made.
[63] While a novelty search is not required, omitting it to save money could easily mean that the cost of preparing and filing an application is wasted. It could also result in less protection than deserved. [64] Before an application is filed, inventors must be identified. Regardless of ultimate ownership, a U.S. application must be filed in the inventors' names, and they usually must participate in "prosecution". [65] An application consists of a description of the invention (the "specification") with or without drawings, a fee, and an oath or declaration that the applicant is the first and true inventor.
[66] The specification must describe the invention in terms that enable those skilled in the art to practice it and conclude with one or more "claims."
The first (what patent attorneys usually mean by "specification") frames the inventors' contributions, but claims identify what is believed to be protectable. [67] Upon receipt, the PTO usually gives applications a filing date and serial number.
[68] Based upon the classification of the claimed subject matter, [69] they are assigned to a patent examiner. When applications come up for action, examiners may object on formal grounds or reject one or more claims as substantively unpatentable. [70] This ex parte process rarely takes less than eighteen months, and may take several years, while the PTO attempts to ensure that the application is complete and enables others to practice the invention.
[72] Are the claims reasonably related to the inventor's contribution?[73] Do they define proper subject matter that is useful, novel, and not obvious at the time of the invention? [74] As mentioned, [75] the novelty requirement is a serious trap for the uninitiated but is easily avoided. No one should disclose or try to commercialize inventions without having discussed the situation with a specialist! U.S. law contains a one-year grace period, but patentability of an invention offered for sale, used or described publicly is immediately lost in most of the world. [76] If attorneys cannot convince examiners that submitted claims are allowable, they may be abandoned or narrowed, an application may be abandoned or refiled, [77] After an application satisfies the PTO, it is prepared for issue upon the payment of a further fee. [84] Here, applicants run a small risk of being drawn into an interference. Only one patent may issue for an invention. In the U.S., interferences determine who is first.
[85] Although uncommon, interference require a believable record of what was done --and when. As soon as innovation begins, inventors should start a notebook. Trusted third parties should be asked to witness it periodically and to indicate, in writing, that they have read and understood it. [86] 
Patents as property
Patents can be used to prevent others from, e.g., making [87] protected subject matter for their duration [88] Patents can also be licensed. This is often little more than a promise not to sue, e.g., if royalties are paid. If the licensee and licensor (or assignee and assignor) are in the same market, careful attention must be given to antitrust restrictions on horizontal agreements. Restrictions on vertical agreements are not so acute, but they should also be avoided. [94] The statute also provides that joint owners, in the absence of contrary agreement, may each practice an invention without accounting. [95] This can create serious problems for independent inventors. Would-be transferees are rarely interested in non-exclusive rights --particularly where substantial risk capital is needed to develop and market the invention.
[96] Unless co-owners agree on terms of a transfer, neither may have anything valuable to convey. This can be avoided if the inventors assign their respective interests to a single entity before disagreements arise.
Enforcement and defenses
If infringement is discovered and negotiations fail, mediation and arbitration are possible. [97] Otherwise an action must be brought in federal court. [98] Besides being able to seek relief from direct infringers, patentees may also challenge those who induce or otherwise contribute to infringement. Even well-heeled applicants must attend to prosecution costs. They cannot afford to do other than prosecute domestic and foreign applications with vigor commensurate to the projected market value of their inventions. If that value is underestimated, searches may miss prior art. Once an invention has been commercialized, infringers have an inherent advantage: They know exactly what it is worth, and this may justify a considerably expanded novelty search. [109] Because patentees have the burden of proving infringement, it may be easier for infringers to show that their acts fall outside the scope of the claims. Once more, poorly financed patentees are particularly vulnerable. If claims are narrower than proven market value warrants, imitators may be able to design around the claims. 
Avoiding infringement
Because independent creation is not a defense, and copying is unnecessary for patent infringement, there is always a possibility that relatively new technology will infringe patents. This can be minimized with a search.
[117] Still, because some pending applications remain unavailable for inspection,[118] subsequently issued patents pose a risk that blocking patents will issue later.
Thus, even technology broadly described in the literature, licensed, or covered by expired patents poses some risk.
[119] Infringement can always be avoided by ceasing to use the technology when a patent issues. Yet, this may be painful if start-up costs have not been recouped or substantial inventory has been accumulated. Hence, firms must exercise every precaution against the possibility of subsequently issued patents.
Contents B. Copyrights[120] 1. Origins and rationale
As with patents, the Constitution is the legal foundation for copyright.
[121] The first copyright law was passed in 1790, but not until 1891 were foreign authors protected.
[122] After a major revision in 1909, the law served remarkably well and was not replaced until 1976 --partly because of technological advances. Amendments, mostly procedural, followed. [123] Copyright is intended to promote the progress of "science." [124] Persons who invest time and private capital can recover investments if consumers favor their work. However, as with inventors, few authors support themselves by direct public sales. Copyright would probably accomplish little if authors could not convey rights to publishers. Obviously, publishers who copy works without paying, e.g., for authors' time can beat the prices of those who do, and copyright goes a long way toward preventing free riding.
Yet, while commercial infringement is comparatively easy to detect and address, non-commercial activity often is not. For example, individuals can make copies of computer software fully equivalent to those on sale --and for a tiny fraction of the cost. Such copying is almost impossible to detect. Hence, honest users surely pay more than would be necessary if all contributed. In extreme situations, contributing users have been unable to support product development.
Subject matter: Patents versus copyrights
Copyrightable subject matter is primarily set forth in § 102. For example, § 102(a) reads:
Copyright protection subsists... in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include... (l) literary works (2) musical works including any accompanying words (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) In no case does copyright protection of an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.
Notwithstanding many changes in the law, very early cases are still important.One of the most important antecedents is an 1879 decision involving bookkeeping forms. Defendant's forms were similar to plaintiff's copyrighted forms but had a different arrangement of columns and used different headings. In finding noninfringement, the Supreme Court said: [126] To give the author of the book an exclusive property in the art described therein, when no examination of its novelty has ever been officially made would be a surprise and a fraud upon the public. That is the province of letters-patent, not of copyright. [Emphasis added.] The emphasized language confirms what was said earlier about the meaning of "art" and "science" in the Constitution. It also suggests that patents are more exclusive than copyrights, but that is not pursued.
Further insight is provided in an opinion by Justice Holmes reversing two lower court holdings that circus posters do not qualify for copyright. Dismissing an apparent objection that copyright for pictures depicting real scenes would interfere with others' legitimate interests, he noted, "Others are free to copy the original. They are not free to copy the copy." [127] Also, dismissing the apparent objection that commercial "art" (in the modern sense) falls within "the useful arts," he held that "A picture is none the less a picture and none the less a subject of copyright that it is used for for an advertisement." [128] Finally, disposing of the idea that posters are artistically unworthy, he said "That these pictures had their worth... is sufficiently shown by the desire to reproduce them without regard for the plaintiff's rights." [129] Finally, consider an important 1954 case.
[130] There, plaintiffs had registered copyright in statuettes of dancing figures, the vast bulk being sold as fully equipped lamps. Defendants, having copied and sold the lamps, argued that plaintiffs' statuettes were protectable only by design patent because, as suggested in Baker, they "required the critical examination given patents to protect the public against monopoly."[131] Pointing out that "Neither the Copyright Statute nor any other says that because a thing is patentable, it may not be copyrighted," [132] the court upheld the copyright. In doing so, Justice Reed observed: [133] Unlike a patent, a copyright gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of the idea --not the idea itself. ... Absent copying there can be no infringement of copyright. Thus, [plaintiffs] may not exclude others from using statuettes of human figures in table lamps; they may only prevent use of copies of their statuettes as such or as incorporated into some other article. [Emphasis added.] In their efforts to distinguish the two, these opinions are as important to an understanding of patents as of copyrights. They also demonstrate the need for patents to be understood at some level even if one desires to do only copyright work. The last case in particular also gives insight into two § 101 definitions that further critically limit copyright: "Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works"include two-dimensional and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art.... [ Because copyright covers sculpture but not "useful" articles, one might assume that Congress regards sculpture as "useless," but the language merely reflects a poor choice of terms. Semantics aside, these definitions cause serious problems for creators of works having other than a solely aesthetic function. It also sometimes leads to unfair discrimination between, e.g., masks that do [134] and costumes that may not [135] qualify. Works that cannot qualify, rather than having automatic protection, are protectable, if at all, by design patents that are often prohibitively expensive and slow. [136] Until recently, this situation faced architects as creators of "useful" works. Now, under § 102(a)(8), architectural works qualify.
[137] Congress has been urged to consider liberalized protection for other "useful" works, but this has been resisted by the insurance industry lest the costs of replacement automobile fenders, grilles --or even shock absorbers be increased. [138] 
Copyrights as property
Provisions governing ownership and transfer are more complex and generally more thorough than those for patents. [139] One complexity arises, particularly with regard to unique works, because people may not distinguish ownership of works and of copyright. [140] Another arises because the statute treats works created "for hire" [141] and works created and assigned differently.
If a work is created by an employee, it is "for hire"; the employer owns everything. If a work is finished before it is sold, it is not "for hire"; the author retains the copyright unless separately conveyed. Commissioned works warrant special care. They may be regarded as joint works, [142] but few can be "for hire" --and only if so agreed in writing. [143] If a work is for hire, the term is the shorter of 95 years from publication or 120 years from creation. For other works, unless published anonymously or under a pseudonym, copyright lasts until 70 years after the death of the last surviviving author, if more than one.
[144] Moreover, authors (or successors) have a right to terminate transfers within a five year period beginning 35 years after the transfer.
[145] If a work is for hire, no termination right exists. [146] Aside from these matters, copyright and patent licenses and assignments are similar; e.g., it is necessary to record transfers to give constructive notice to later transferees.
[147]
Deposit and notice
Nothing other than "fixing" by or under the authority of an author is necessary.
[148] Neither notice nor deposit are required for U.S. copyright protection. Deposit of two copies of the best edition of many works is required, however, and failure to deposit following a Copyright Office demand can result in penalties. [149] Notice warrants closer attention. Under the 1909 Act, failure to give proper notice when a work was published was fatal: State protection was lost, and federal protection was forfeited. While copyright notice is unnecessary, [150] it is still a good idea. Some countries where an author might have rights under international treaties require traditional notice, as well as, e.g., "All rights reserved." [151] Also, after being free to copy published works lacking notice, some people will need to learn that lack of notice no longer means lack of copyright. [152] 
Registration
While registration is unnecessary for copyright protection, infringement actions cannot be brought by owners of works originating in the U.S. until registration is at least attempted. [153] However, it is inexpensive, [154] generally straightforward and confers important remedial advantages --regardless of country of origin. Failure to register unpublished works forfeits statutory damages and attorney fees for infringement commenced before registration. For published works registered within three months of publication, those remedies are available even for infringements commenced earlier. [155] .
Registration follows an "examination". [156] The Copyright Office sometimes rejects an application for improper subject matter, [157] but registration is largely ministerial. Assuming appropriate subject matter, only subjective novelty is usually required. [158] Thus, many valid copyrights apparently could cover very similar works (e.g. , photographs of the same tree, taken from the same angle), each in a different owner. [159] Even works derived from prior works (e.g., a film based on a novel) seem generally to qualify, [160] but these are of course subject to any rights in the originals.
Enforcement and defenses
Exclusive rights are set forth in § 106. They include the right to copy and sell (or rent) protected works and, for some, the right to perform or display publicly. [161] Persons who directly infringe copyrights or induce or otherwise contribute to infringement [162] must be sued in federal court.[163] Subject to possible limitation based on time of registration, [164] remedies include injunction, impounding (and destroying or otherwise disposing of) infringing copies, costs and attorneys' fees, damages and profits, and statutory minimum damages.
[165] Those who infringe willfully and for gain suffer larger statutory damages and may incur criminal sanctions. [166] As with patents, invalidity and noninfringement are possible defenses --along with generic defenses such as unclean hands [167] or fraud on the Copyright Office. [168] A certificate of registration issued before or within five years of publication constitutes only "prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate,"[169] but invalidity is an uncommon defense. [170] Suits are more apt to turn on infringement. Noninfringement can be framed several ways, e.g., a work was independently created, [171] or use was proper. The latter can be further subdivided, e.g., use was (1) not forbidden by § 106, [172] (2) permitted by § 102(b) [173] or (3) permitted by "fair use" as defined in § § 107-121. The last two are most likely to cause trouble for newcomers.
Copyright registrations do not delimit coverage. [174] More than in the case of patents, judges often must decide whether what was copied was protected. They may conclude, e.g., that a directory identical to another does not infringe,[175] whereas a motion picture that is only substantially similar to an earlier play does. [176] Originally created by the courts, fair use defenses now occupy perhaps about half of the statute. [ [181] Teachers and librarians were particularly eager to have fair uses spelled out precisely, but this was not done. [182] Indeed it seems impossible to define "fair" with the kind of precision nonlawyers (or law students) may want.
As with patents, copyright litigation can also be affected by the status of the infringer. Injunctions do not lie against the federal government, [183] and state governments may not be sued in federal court.
[184] Prior dealings are troublesome --partly because of the work for hire doctrine,[185] but problems go beyond that. [186] 
Avoiding infringement
Because independent origin is a defense, liability can generally be avoided with records that show it. Yet, in one case, where two works were very much alike and the first was well known, the defense failed: It was concluded that copying, even if unconscious, had occurred . [187] When using another's work, caution is warranted --particularly where there have been prior dealings. [188] Also, one can no longer regard a work without notice as being in the public domain.
[189] Further, while "fair use" of another's work is permitted, a comparatively small amount of copying may infringe if it interferes with an owner's potential income or is more than incidentally connected with the user 's income. [190] Contents C. Trade Secrets 1. Source, subject matter and federal preemption Trade secret protection originated in common law, and the 1939 Restatement of Torts attempted to codify it. [191] More recently there has been a trend toward statutory treatment. A uniform act has been drafted and adopted in whole or part in several states, and theft of trade secrets is now addressed in the federal criminal code. [192] While the basics are the same, important details vary from state to state. [193] Also, federal law can have a major impact on trade secret law. For example, in the decade following the famous Sears and Compco preemption decisions, [194] IP attorneys wondered about the extent to which trade secret law still existed. However, a 1974 decision [195] held that, although subject matter often overlaps and legal objectives are similar, federal patent law does not preempt state trade secret protection.
Copyright preemption may pose a problem, too --particularly with unpublished works [196] since 17 U.S.C. § 301 became effective. [197] Now, § 301(a), leaves no room for the states once a copyrightable work is "fixed in a tangible medium." [198] Moreover, § 301(b) provides: [199] Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any State with respect to --(1) subject matter that does not come within the subject matter of copyright..., including works of authorship not fixed in any tangible medium of expression, or...
Thus, it will be unclear whether state trade secret law applies to some controversies. However, if any part of the subject matter falls within copyright, plaintiffs will usually want to sue in copyright and append state counts. Copyright remedies are superior --particularly if registration is prompt. [200] State trade secret and other protection, if not preempted, can have potentially unlimited duration, [201] but, given their likely duration, this will rarely be important.
Acquiring, preserving and enforcing trade secret rights
Both the Restatement and uniform act cover broad subject matter, but the latter explicitly includes information of potential as well as of current competitive value. It also provides that information is to be regarded as secret if "reasonable measures" are taken to preserve secrecy. [202] Still, both leave a large amount of ambiguity, e.g., where an employee changes jobs. How does one differentiate between information that is, on the one hand, part of an employee's stock in trade and, on the other, property of the employer? [203] Employers often try to avoid the issue by using covenants not to compete, but, if covenant conditions are unreasonable [204] or in excess of statutory maxima, [205] they will be unenforceable. Analogous problems can also arise when a business is sold or when two companies are dealing in other ways [206] --particularly if the obligation to preserve or not to use secrets is implied. However, the Restatement and the uniform act do not appear to differ on such issues. Also, both the Restatement and uniform act forbid use of secrets obtained by criminal or tortious conduct. [207] However, neither seems to preclude using information obtained from incautious speakers in PTO elevators. Still, the latter includes "espionage" as wrongful. If this covers photographing plants from navigable airspace, [208] does it also include photographing from the roof of an adjacent building or a knothole in a fence? Whatever the answers might be, Supreme Court decisions forbid state laws that preclude use of information obtained by independent effort or reverse engineering. [209] 
Outside submissions
Outside idea or invention submissions are a special case and seem best governed by contract law. Lacking a written contract, one should consider the custom in the trade and the professional status of the person providing information. If the outsider is an "amateur," and no established trade practice or prior dealings can be relied upon to establish an implied contract, recovery is unlikely: The outsider may be considered a "volunteer" or, if the information lacks objective novelty, be found to have submitted something of no value. [210] In contrast, if a submission comes from a professional and the custom is to accept and pay for the use of "unsolicited" information, a contract may be implied: The recipient may be obligated to pay fair value even if the information lacks objective novelty. [211] Attorneys who have the opportunity to represent an outside submitter should try to get a written agreement. Minimally, it should provide that the recipient, in consideration of the opportunity to evaluate the information, agrees neither to use it without compensation (later to be negotiated) nor to disclose it. However, attempts often fail: [212] Companies do not want to risk having to pay for what they already know or to be liable if information gets into the wrong hands. Also, companies may already have many of unused, internally-generated ideas and not be interested in considering more![213] 
Trade secrets as property
Avoiding infringement
Using information not derived from publications, independent research or copying products in the market warrants caution. For example, when hiring research and development personnel from competitors, it seems wise to examine written employment agreements for non-competition clauses. Also, one must never encourage others to disregard contracts: Inducing a breach of contract is usually a willful tort. [31] In general, intellectual property rights do not permit owners to sell protected works. With regard to copyright for example, it should be clear that no one has a right to sell obscene works or works that infringe privacy rights, even if copyrighted.
[32] Section 271(a).
[33] Frost, supra note 30, at 76. In a sense all property is monopoly. ... [M]y monopoly in chair A does not prevent others from making... chairs B, C, or D. If, however, I owned the idea of a chair, and others could not make... anything embodying that idea, the whole society would be left standing until I chose to sell... on my terms.
Unfortunately, Shapiro does not explain, and I fail to see, how patentees have advantages not enjoyed by owners of chairs. At least beyond the first inventor, patents do not cover anything as broad as the "idea of a chair." Assuming rocks came first, then stools, people sit on those unless they are prepared to pay the patentee's price. When the patent expires (something that doesn't happen to title in chairs), anyone who cares to can make something that without the patentee's contribution is unlikely to exist --particularly if significant private risk capital is needed to invent it.
Consider a new cure for AIDS as an extreme example. What would induce its private development and testing without patents? If the concern is that a firm might offer it under only "unconscionable" terms, consider, e.g., that patentees cannot get injunctions against the federal government; see 28 U.S.C. § 1498. In this vein, see generally, Thomas G. Field, Jr., Pharmaceuticals and Intellectual Property: Meeting Needs Throughout the World, 31 Idea 3 (1990).
Moreover, patent enforcement may sometimes be counterproductive; see, e.g., James Lardner, Fast Forward...
(Mentor 1987).
[34] Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (dissenting). [36] Supra note 30. As part of a lively exchange, Frank Press stated: "For twenty-five years the question of innovation and Americans' ability to innovate has been... around; it's been studied to death;" id., at 40. Unfortunately, this suggests more than is true. Much data has been collected, but its meaning is difficult if not impossible to discern. [98] See 28 U.S.C. § § 1338(a), 1400, and 1498.
[99] Section 271(b) and (c). Regarding the latter, see Dawson, 448 U.S. 176. See also, § § 271(f) and (g).
[100] See generally, § § 281-88. Also, § 289 provides minimum statutory damages for design patent infringement.
[101] These are the first two enumerated patent defenses; see generally, § 282.
[102] Id., first sentence.
[ 1. While the CAFC may have more sympathy for such inventors than some circuits have heretofore shown (see, e.g., supra notes [41] [42] [43] , it remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will go along.
[106] There is even a possibility of invalidity based on another's earlier secret use of the invention. [109] Therefore, they may be motivated to investigate, e.g., foreign publications and other prior art that would invalidate the patent under § 102(a).
[ [117] Supra note 61.
[118] See § 122.
[119] See, e.g., § 101 providing for improvement patents. These are likely to be narrower than so-called "pioneer" patents. If the earlier patents are still in effect, improvement patents cannot be practiced without infringing --further illustrating the proposition that intellectual property only excludes others.
Many countries avoid such problems, e.g., by granting patents to the first to file and publishing pending applications; see generally World Intellectual Property Organization, supra note 76. The U.S. now publishes pending applications; see § 122..
[120] Citations in this subsection, unless otherwise indicated, are to 17 U.S.C.
[121] Supra note 6.
[213] See generally, Del I. Hawkins & Gerald G. Udel l, Corporate Caution and Unsolicited New Product Ideas, 58 J.P.O. Soc'y 375 (1976). See also, supra note 3.
[214] See generally, Hilton, supra note 192.
[215] Supra note 6.
[216] Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 560.
[217] 416 U.S. at 489-91.
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IV. Preserving Competition on the Merits
A. Preventing Misrepresentations Generally 1. Suits forbidden at common law
As mentioned, competition can be thwarted when firms misrepresent the source, quality or price of their goods or services. At common law, private parties could take legal action against such misrepresentation only if they were uniquely affected.
[219] Unlike competitors, consumers can usually show specific injury, and aggregate injury can be very large, but damage suffered by individual consumers is often inadequate to justify suit. [220] Moreover, if firms continue to misrepresent, aggregate injury may snowball as others compete, not by, e.g., dropping prices, but by making even more egregious misrepresentations. Such problems could first be addressed other than by consumers when the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was created to enjoin "unfair methods of competition."[221] However, only after an amendment in 1938, could the FTC clearly enjoin "unfair and deceptive acts and practices" that did not injure competition. [222] Not until much later did states begin to deal with such problems. [223] Honest firms may find the cost of suit against a competitor's misrepresentations to be justified, but not until the Lanham Act was passed in 1947, did they have a cause of action.
[224] Since then, § 43(a) [225] has allowed them to seek injunctions [226] even though it may be impossible to show special damages, [227] i.e., that particular sales were lost because of a competitor's misrepresentations. Modern cases sometimes consider whether defendant's activities sufficiently affect the plaintiff in particular, e.g., to warrant standing, but it is difficult to see why a commercial enterprise would sue without strong conviction of potential harm --particularly if competitors could derive as much or more benefit. [228] Indeed, in the latter situation, firms might ask the FTC or another public entity to take action.
a. Unfair competition, dilution and right of publicity
Trademarks are discussed in detail below, but "unfair competition" [229] suits furnish a classic illustration of the difference between this and the previous discussion. If a seller deliberately or carelessly represents its goods as coming from or being sponsored by another, injury is generally clear. Thus, owners of marks have long been able to bring actions if another uses similar marks on competing goods or services.
[230] To prevail, they usually must show that words or other devices used to indicate source are inherently distinctive or have acquired "secondary" [231] meaning. [232] They usually must also show that consumer are or are likely to be confused. Yet, where a defendant intentionally represents its or another's goods or services as those of the plaintiff, both requirements for relief may be presumed. [233] Famous marks present a particularly interesting situation insofar as owners may prevent their use on very dissimilar goods or services --where "unfair competition" does not literally exist. [234] Yet, consumers may be misled in the short term, and both consumers and owners of famous marks may suffer from erosion of a mark's uniqueness. [235] Recently, state and federal "dilution" statutes have sought to expand this law by protecting less well-known marks.
[236] Still, it is unclear how unique a mark must be to qualify for protection. It is less clear if marks differ. [237] Famous persons can also prevent firms from suggesting associations that do not exist. A variety of theories may be used, [238] and "right of publicity" is one of them. [239] This right is sometimes described as what public persons get in return for their loss of privacy, but its boundaries are far from clear. While privacy rights do not survive their owner's death, a right of publicity may --particularly if the person had been engaged in commercial sponsorship while living.
[240] However, some publicity cases go well beyond preventing misrepresentation and raise preemption issues where the work to be protected has been fixed, e.g., by videorecording, by or under the authority of its owner. [241] b
. Trade libel, product disparagement and free speech
Injurious statements about a firm (trade libel) or its products (disparagement), may cause demonstrable harm and might be presumed. Yet, injunctions may be unavailable and damages difficult to recover. The law is a mix of sometimes arcane common law and, increasingly, unsettled constitutional law and is not easy to understand.
One should first distinguish commercial and non-commercial speech. The latter is not subject to prior restraint, i. e., injunction. [242] Also, because the threat of tort liability can deter speech, it is often difficult to recover damages --particularly if the subject is of public concern. [243] Offers to sell were long regarded as unprotected, but public interference with truthful advertising has since been limited. Cases apt to be most durable focus on the need for readily available consumer information. [244] Also, the FTC has moved against private restraints on competitive advertising. [245] Because of such developments, early cases enjoining, e.g., consumer libel and disparagement are of doubtful current vitality [246] --as are cases enjoining other disparaging activity. [247] Even cases awarding damages merit careful scrutiny. [248] Speech involving matters of public concern is protected two ways. First, plaintiff may have to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that defendant's offensive statements are false. Second, plaintiff may have to show, again by clear and convincing evidence, that demonstrably false injurious statements were known by defendant to be false or that defendant acted maliciously or in reckless disregard of the truth.
For a public person to get relief, a clear showing of malice or reckless disregard of the truth must be made, and, although there is remarkably little law on point, it seems difficult to imagine why a commercial firm or its goods would not also bear that burden. [249] Even when the speaker is a competitor, the burden ought not be lowered, e. g., by presuming malice. [250] In 1988, § 43(a) of the Lanham Act was amended to permit such suits as a matter of federal law if the speaker is engaged in commercial advertising or promotion. [251] It will be interesting to see how federal courts develop the law, e.g., whether they do so based on the Constitutional or tort doctrine, [252] and the extent to which they find that firms and their products are subject to honest, if mistaken, criticism by competitors who have an especially strong incentive to inform consumers.
General observations on § 43(a)
The Lanham Act may now be used to address a range of unfair trade practices regardless of whether they could be addressed at common law. It bears emphasis that § 43(a) permits federal suit for source misrepresentation, regardless of diversity and the amount in controversy --or federal trademark registration. [253] Moreover, remedies equal those afforded federally registered marks. [254] Thus, two alleged benefits of federal registration [255] (federal jurisdiction and usually superior remedies) are available to owners of any mark. Still, if a defendant's behavior is particularly egregious, one should at least consider whether punitive damages or other state relief might be better in particular situations. [256] In all cases involving alleged misrepresentations, consumers' impressions are critical. Facially false statements (or facially deceptive marks) may not deceive [257] --and facially truthful statements may create false impressions [258] Competent surveys are often the best way to resolve those and similar issues addressed below.
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B. Trademarks[259]
Development of the federal law
Source indicators appear to have been used for thousands of years. [260] However, general legal protection against another's use of misleading source indicators is more recent. [261] The first federal trademark statute was passed in 1870, but it was struck down in 1879 [262] for exercising power conferred by neither the patent and copyright nor commerce clauses. [263] Although another trademark statute was enacted in 1881, and still others in 1905 and 1920, these were quite limited, [264] . Still, many cases prior to the famous 1938 Erie decision were decided under federal common law. [265] For example, in Kellogg, decided shortly thereafter, the Court observed:
[266] "But no claim has been made that the local law is any different from the general law on the subject, and both parties have relied almost entirely on federal precedents." Efforts to reform the federal law had begun earlier, but it is ironic that the first hearings on a new law were held the same year. With few amendments, that is the law today.
In Lanham Act § 45, "commerce" is defined as "all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress." [269] Given the modern view of the commerce clause, federal law could well have exhausted the field. However, this has not happened, and state law can be significant.
[270]
Trademark rationale revisited
The rationale for trademark law is starkly different from that for protecting work products. One firm may forbid another from imitating its trade dress, but injunctions must be narrowly crafted to permit competitors to duplicate otherwise unprotected products.
[271] Analogous limits apply to names. It would do consumers little good if a firm could copy a product but not identify it in a way that consumers would recognize. [272] Notwithstanding these limitations, trademarks are sometimes seen as anticompetitive. Brand names for pharmaceuticals in particular have been controversial, but it would be difficult to eliminate them. [273] Critics tend to ignore the need of consumers to search out low cost, reliable products as well as the role of source identifiers in furthering that end. Antitrust law rests in part on the idea that competition encourages firms to produce the highest quality products or services at the lowest possible price. Before this can occur, assuming that other firms have a right to copy a particular product or service, consumers need accurate information about the source and other characteristics of products. [274] Particularly for products without close consumer safety regulation, firms' investments in goodwill may also provide the most reliable assurance of safe product design and quality. [275] It is difficult to imagine how a competitive market could function without source indicators --even so-called "generics" may have them!
Obtaining rights: strength of marks
As with trade secrets and copyrights, trademark rights usually arise automatically once certain conditions have been met. First, a word or other symbol must be used as a source indicator. [276] This is commonly done by using Servicemark SM or Trademark TM ; the symbol for a Federally Registered Mark ® should not be used prior to federal registration. Second, it must be recognized as such. [277] Once those conditions exist, the first user [278] can usually prevent later users --despite their good faith --from using the same or a similar mark in such a way as to cause confusion.
The second requirement is most easily met if distinctive marks are chosen. If not, enforcement can be difficult to impossible. [279] For example, [280] marks that merely identify goods or services, e.g., "Two-hour Dry Cleaning," or are associated with other firms should be avoided. Again, one cannot get exclusive rights to common names for products or to functional aspects of trade dress.
[281] Also, one cannot acquire rights in marks similar to those already in use. [282] Words that describe a product or service can acquire source significance. Yet, they cannot be readily registered,
[283] and relief will be limited.
[284] If they merely identify a seller by surname, it will be difficult, at best, to limit others with the same name. [285] If they indicate geographical origin, it will be difficult to stop others in the same location. Finally, one cannot prevent firms from using words needed to describe products. Thus, even if users of such terms eventually convince consumers that they indicate a particular company, relief will be limited.
Marks that suggest, without describing, some favorable characteristic of a product are better. Thus, "Whopper" or "Ultra-bright" can be strong marks, given that competitor will be hard pressed to give an acceptable reason for using them in naming or describing their products.
Words that misdescribe a product can be either very good or very poor. A term that leads consumers to expect something other than what they get is unlikely to be protected and, worse, is useless for building goodwill. In contrast, "Rabbit" brand automobiles or "Apple" brand computers are unlikely to confuse anyone and may even suggest a favorable product characteristic. Nevertheless, others can, of course, use such words for their ordinary meaning. [286] The strongest marks are coined words such as "Kodak" or wholly arbitrary product or package designs. [287] Yet, truly new products or services for which no common names exist are a special case. In such an instance, one cannot stop with a coined word such as "Xerox". A generic name must be chosen to identify the product, e. g., "photocopier". [288] Also, firms must take care to ensure that consumers are aware of and can distinguish them. [289] This can be difficult for market leaders, but failure means loss of trademark. When the patent on shredded wheat eventually expired, consumers had no other name by which to seek the product. Thus, a competitor was permitted to use it.
[290]
Once a mark is chosen, protection is acquired in new geographical and product (or service) markets as in initial markets --unless another with pre-existing rights is encountered. [291] Also, rights can extend beyond markets actually served. [292] For example, if a firm sells both granola and shredded wheat under a mark, consumers may assume that cornflakes with that mark have the same source. Further, when a firm is known by a name that it does not formally use, other firms may be prevented from using it. [293] In short, a firm's rights extend to any use of the same or a similar mark in circumstances where source (or sponsorship) confusion can occur.
Registering marks
Marks may be registered under state law. But such registrations are of dubious value. [294] Federal registration is the primary focus of of the Lanham Act. It provides for two PTO [295] registers. Principal registration is far more valuable and will be the focus here. [296] Federal, in stark contrast with state, law affords the opportunity to protect marks nationally --even though they are used in a smaller area. [297] Also, marks that qualify will be presumptively valid[298] and may become "incontestable" after five years, [299] i.e., subject to very limited challenge. [300] Still it is worth keeping in mind that: [301] Every right a patentee has is given to him by the Patent Office. On the other hand, the acquisition of the right to exclude others from the use of a trademark results from the fact of use and the common law, independently of registration in the Patent Office. The happenstance that trademarks are registered in the Patent Office should not result in confusing the principles involved in dissimilar proceedings with respect to wholly dissimilar rights. It is in the public interest to maintain registrations of technically good trademarks on the register so long as they are still in use. The register then reflects commercial reality... trademark rights, unlike patent rights, continue notwithstanding cancellation of those additional rights which the Patent Office is empowered by statute to grant.
Nevertheless, several hurdles must be overcome. First, registration does not ordinarily create rights, and use must occur before registration. [302] Also, at least until recently, the PTO required use to be in rather than merely affect interstate commerce. [303] Since 1988, applications can be based on bona fide intent to use, but registration cannot occur until use [304] --and the PTO may continue to require an effect on interstate commerce before registering a mark. [305] For purposes of registration, marks are subdivided into several categories: [306] (1) trademarks, (2) service marks, (3) collective marks and (4) certification marks.
[307] Although these categories are not legally important, respective examples are: (1) "Bandaid" or "Kool-Aid," (2) "H & R Block" or "The Educational Testing Service," (3) "The Dairymen's Association" and (4) "Underwriter's Laboratories" or "The Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval." There is also a classification scheme for goods and services, but it is insignificant within the U.S. except for purposes of registration. [308] Echoing points made earlier, the mark itself must be capable of distinguishing a product or service and cannot, e. g.: (1) comprise, e.g., immoral, scandalous or deceptive matter; (2) be confusingly similar to marks of others; (3) be descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive; or (4) consist of a surname.
[309] The last two prohibitions may be overcome if an applicant shows five years exclusive use or, better yet, demonstrates that the mark has acquired distinctiveness (or "secondary" meaning).
[310]
If an applicant survives initial examination, the mark is published for opposition. If it does not get into a contest with another applicant, registrant or user, [311] and use has occurred, [312] a certificate of registration issues. It is "prima facie evidence of the validity of the registration... and registrant's exclusive right to use [it] ." [313] Registrations, subject to filing a certificate of continuing use in the fifth year, [314] last 10 years. [315] 
Marks as property
Trademarks have no value except as part of a business and as they serve some function with regard to indicating source or sponsorship. [316] Subject to those limitations, trademarks and registrations can be assigned and trademarks can be licensed. A business may be sold without conveying goodwill or assigning marks, but marks cannot be assigned (or probably retained) without the business. [317] Trademarks can be licensed with fewer restrictions, and an enormous franchising industry has grown up around this proposition. Thus, one sees children's clothes and toys bearing the marks of television programs and motion pictures --or hats, T-shirts and a host of other things bearing the marks of soft drink companies and professional sports teams.
[318] In such circumstances, the owner must police the products or services for which the mark is licensed or risk loss of the mark. [319] While IP licenses may often be no more than a promise not to sue, they cannot be so regarded in the trademark area. Failing to police licensees' use of marks is likely to work a fraud on the public and could be the basis for denying relief. However, trademark law is much stricter: Failure to police the use of one's marks may forfeit rights in them even without consumer harm.
[320] The result may be less harsh if independent parties cross-license to settle an infringement dispute, but, even there, disputants should consider the broad implications of their agreement. For example, both marks will be weaker, and it will be easier for third parties to adopt more similar marks for more similar goods than would otherwise be possible. [321] 6. Enforcement and defenses Remedies available for trademark infringement include (1) injunctive relief, (2) damages, (3) profits, (4) costs and attorneys' fees, and (5) seizure and destruction of infringing articles.
[326]
As before, defenses include invalidity, noninfringement and general defenses such as unclean hands. [327] A defendant can assert general invalidity, i.e., that the mark has been abandoned [328] or has become the common name for goods or services in question. [329] Also, a defendant can assert invalidity in a particular market, e.g., by virtue of prior use.
[330]
Noninfringement can be established, e.g., by rebutting the plaintiff's showing of likelihood of confusion.
Probably the best way to show, e.g., whether the use of similar marks on camera equipment from different sources or the same mark on both cameras and radios is likely to confuse is to survey purchasers of such equipment.
[331]
Finally, defendants in trademark infringement often have enormous opportunities to avoid or narrow injunctive relief in light of their right to accurately describe themselves, their geographic location or their products.
[332]
Avoiding trademark infringement
The first step in avoiding trademark infringement is to stay clear of the marks of well known parties and potential competitors. Evidence of an attempt to trade on another's goodwill will generate a presumption that the junior user has in fact accomplished what it set out to do. [333] Next, it is necessary to search for unknown parties who may be using a proposed mark. At a minimum, one must avoid adopting the mark of a federal registrant. [334] Even though the registrant may not be in the local market, its right to enter seems clear. Also, it is good to search beyond federal and state registers. Failure to do so can result in being excluded from any geographical or product market where others have common law rights. Fortunately, firms provide search services at a price apt to be less than the cost of a later name change. While searches may not spot all uses of a mark in very limited geographical areas, they can furnish reasonable assurance of being able to use a mark throughout the country.
Still, even with the best of intentions, it may be difficult to avoid problems with similar marks: Attorneys have characterized the problem of trying to predict likelihood of confusion, hence trademark infringement, as a "black art." [335] Sensitivity to general principles of consumer behavior --especially those appearing repeatedly in cases --is useful but may prove inadequate to deal with specific situations,[336] and a survey of potentially affected consumers may be necessary.
[337]
Once a mark is cleared, federal registration should be seriously considered before using it, and bona fide intent applications allow one to learn whether others will object before significant promotional investments have been made. If use has begun, federal registration should be considered even more closely. Even state registration, although extremely limited, [338] makes it easier for other firms to learn of one's prior use and is reputed to make it easier to get relief in state courts. In short, the best defense is a good offense.
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V. Conclusion
This article has identified the most egregious pitfalls for those uninformed about IP [339] and provided strategies for avoiding infringement, [340] but readers should come away with more. For example, this discussion should help readers begin to compare and contrast alternatives for recouping investments in developing and marketing goods and services --in a way that is impossible in detailed treatments of individual IP topics. [341] Ultimately clients decide how much protection they need and can afford, but first they must be apprised of their options and be made aware of certain risks. [342] This discussion should facilitate such an appraisal in the bulk of cases [343] --particularly because its scope in relation to its size has dictated careful attention to the most important and durable aspects of the law. [344] The article also attempts to provide a general feel for the diverse expanse of IP law. For example, some ask whether IP is really "property" or "torts." After taking a broad look at the area, the question seems silly. Sometimes, one must clearly attend to things that come to mind when focusing on "property," i.e., clearing and registering title, inverse condemnation[345] or estates. [346] One must also usually consider the scope of overlapping and often competing commercial interests. [347] Because no interest, whether or not denominated as property, is absolute, the meaningful question is not whether one has a "property" interest but whether the law affords a particular interest the necessary degree of recognition and protection, if any, in particular circumstances. Beyond this, protected interests are protected by tort and transferred by contract --regardless of whether or not, for example, title can or must be registered. With regard to torts, one must have a sense of the range of possible causes of action as well as associated defenses, remedies, and certainly costs. Also, one must be alert to a variety of contract problems such as the tendency of courts to read restrictive covenants narrowly.
Finally, readers should find many opportunities for applying law developed in one IP area to others. For example, students are often surprised to find that the U.S. Supreme Court turned to the patent statute to determine whether Sony's sale of videorecorders constituted copyright infringement. [348] This illustrates as well as any case that very distinct parts of IP often have important common foundations. Once this is fully appreciated, the door opens to a host of opportunities. Yet, conversely, when might fair use provisions in the copyright statute be helpful in answering a charge of patent infringement? [349] Or, how might the copyrightability of obscene books [350] be used to argue for patentability of an "illegal" invention --and what distinction between patents and copyrights might influence the results in a particular case? The more one considers IP law broadly, the more apparent such opportunities become.
Nevertheless, caution is warranted, and one must be alert to important distinctions between the several species of IP. 
